The Dutch Wars, 1624-1654 (Part 2)

Invasion of Pernambuco - 2nd Period 1630-54

Dutch privateer Peter Heyn captured the Spanish Silver Fleet in the Antilles, that was more than twice the initial capital of the West Indies Company. This encouraged another invasion of Brazil.

The Dutch chose Pernambuco, a prosperous hereditary and not royal captaincy, less defended than Bahia, closer to Europe and the African coast.

In addition, there was the port of Recife, an excellent natural naval base, capable of harbouring and protecting huge attack squadron and protected by two natural moat rivers.

Based in Recife, they believed they would dominate and maintain Brazil with few expenses, ruin Portuguese-Spanish shipping on the coast, and seize, through privateering, fabulous wealth transported from South America to Europe through Spain and Portugal.

With little spending Recife could become impregnable against land attacks, as long as they kept control of maritime access.

Such strategic appreciation was valid as this naval and land base, Recife, would withstand for 24 years, until the Dutch lost naval supremacy in the area to England.

Thus in Pernambuco they sought not sugar, but an impregnable land, naval and land base, Recife, protected by two enormous natural moats, the rivers Capibaribe and Beberibe. This is the real vision of the choice of Pernambuco in the strategic Saliente Nordestino.

The people of Pernambuco were not given treaties of "mutual friendship and alliance" with the ruler, for after a century of Portuguese colonisation, they already had fond love for the land and its symbols. The great majority of the people of Pernambuco already communed with the Portuguese-Spanish ideal - The expansion of the Faith and the Empire.

The governor of Pernambuco Matias de Albuquerque, on learning of the intended invasion, did everything in his power to transform Recife and Olinda into strong places of war.

The conquest of Recife and Olinda

On February 15, 1630, the powerful Dutch fleet commanded by Admiral Hendrick Loncq appeared threatening in front of Recife. It consisted of 50 ships and a total of 7,000 men.

The invader knew that the effective Luso-Brazilian derision could not cover the entire coast of Pernambuco and that the defenders had not received reinforcements from the Metropolis.

While most of the fleet was battling with Recife, 16 ships with 3,000 men sailed north under the command of Colonel Waerdenburg. They disembarked, quietly, without any reaction, on the unprotected beach of Pau Amarelo.

On February 16, in the morning, the invader began the progression to Olinda with three regiments. The resistance in Olinda was fierce, but unequal. Recife was attacked on February 20 and Forte São Jorge reacted bravely under the leadership of António Lima. The enemy attacked Fort St. George on March 1. To crush this fort and its brave defenders, they concentrated a storm of grenades, thrown from cannons of the sea and earth. The Pernambucans were not discouraged, redoubled in courage and firmness, repelling all attacks for a day. On March 2, after a few hours of bombing, Antonio Lima noticed that the walls of the fort had collapsed, the guns had been dismantled, with a great number of dead and wounded among their brave due to the enemy fire.

The Fort of St George surrendered to the overwhelming enemy warlike superiority, but he showed Colonel Waerdenburg, as he wrote to Holland: "The soldiers of this land are alive and impetuous and are by no means lambs." and not as he had previously thought, "easy to be drawn to each other's friendship and covenant."

After the surrender of Fort St. George, the Dutch, eagerly awaiting the surrender of numerous garrisons, were surprised and disconcerted when they saw the brave António Lima come out of the ruins, accompanied by half a dozen survivors.

Recife was occupied on March 3, 1630 after 15 days of memorable and moving resistance. But the Pernambucans did not give up the fight. Matias de Albuquerque proclaimed to the whole captaincy the disposition to fight to the death.

Gathering all the brave, solidary with his attitude, and in a place where many of the paths that Olinda and Recife demanded the interior, established in the short term Arraial do Bom Jesus.

This fort was built with solid ramparts and well protected by formidable trenches and pits, and would have resisted for five years the rush and the eagerness to conquer the invader.

The defensive system completed the establishment of a ring of fence around Recife and Olinda, made up of offices, to prevent the enemy from leaving with impunity from Recife to obtain water and firewood.

This group was part of the defense system of the interior of Pernambuco and the blockade line of Olinda and Recife.

It was a strategic, intelligent and creative Brazilian solution to the military problem and a manifestation of genuine military or Brazilian land doctrine.

The Dutch have fortified themselves. They built the forts of the Brum and of the Five Tips, until existing today. This work of fortifications was not calm and tranquil. The Luso-Brazilians organized ambushes and, at all hours of the day and night, made bold and deadly blows against the enemy. The invader was not allowed to walk unconcerned, even in his domains. Death followed in their footsteps as they ventured out of the fortifications. The land connection Olinda - Recife became a fatal road for the Dutch.

Consequently, planted in the earth, they had nothing to enjoy for the sustenance and maintenance of the conquest.

Its food has become dependent on Europe or some corsair expedition on the coast. The land and the children of Pernambuco denied everything to the invader, making life a living hell.

In the siege places of Recife and Olinda, the defenders took turns in the hoe and the musket, planting and fighting.

According to Lopes Santiago "The food was scarce, many times the soldiers did not have an ear of corn for the ration."

The invader was continuously reinforced. By the end of 1630, 3,500 men arrived in Pernambuco. For the defenders, nothing was sent from the Metropolis in a year and a half.

At the beginning of 1631, he founded in Recife the squadron of Adrian Jansen Pater, composed of 16 ships and about 1,000 men. On July 13, the Portuguese-Spanish fleet under the command of D. António de Oquendo, made up of 32 ships with 2,000 men, arrived in Salvador.

On September 12, the two squadrons met in Abre Olhos, (Abrolhos) with the Spanish-Portuguese victory. It enabled the Arraial do Bom Jesus (Velho) to be reinforced with troops of the Prince of Bagnuoli.

More daring strikes were fired at the enemy, who feared the double attack by land and sea. He tried to abandon Olinda and to fortify himself even more in Recife. Before the abandonment of Olinda, the Dutch proposed to deliver it by heavy ransom, otherwise they would destroy it.

Matias de Albuquerque, the 1st Luso-Brazilian to be a general of Portugal, replied:

'The Pernambucans, with arms in hand, do not buy, conquer. They know how to give loads of musket balls, not sugar boxes. With the enemies who lack faith are unstable contracts that establish the blood, and of no firmness those who secure the word. Burn Olinda, if you can not keep her, we'll know how to build a better one.'

And he concluded that he wished to leave in the memory of Pernambuco, for all future times the triumphs of the captaincy and the punishment that the invader would suffer.

On November 25, 1631, the brave heroes of the resistance, with tears in their eyes and the revolt in their souls, saw the burning of the beautiful, rich and majestic capital of Pernambuco, the fruit of nearly a century of hard work and enormous sacrifices. The Dutch soldiers soldier were disillusioned with this way of warfare that consumed lives, wasted time and had few results.

When discouragement began to plow between them, the Pernamban Domingos Fenandes Calabar deserted to their ranks and came to assist them,  His defection changed the course of the war. Skilled and cunning in ambushes, he began to guide the Dutch by revealing the secrets of the land and teaching the Brazilian war.

And the expansionist campaign of conquest took place.

During this victorious expansionist campaign, stood out the brave resistance in Rio Formoso, a strong one commanded by Pedro Albuquerque and having 20 men.

Intimited to surrender, they replied that they would fight to the last breath of life.

On the fourth thrust, the enemy entered the fortification and found the bodies of their 20 brave defenders, who performed with honor and glory the oath they made, in protest against the invasion. Pedro de Albuquerque, wounded, was lying on the ground.

Chief Von Schkoppe was moved by the bravery and heroism of these men and pointed the fine example to his soldiers. Seeing Pedro de Albuquerque fall, but with the sword wielded, a Dutch fighter ran to take the sword.

Von Schkoppe, upon realizing, shouted, "Stop! Do not take the glorious sword of a hero." Pedro de Albuquerque was rescued and treated with great respect. They granted him freedom on his word until he left for Lisbon.

What a great difference of attitude of the Pernambuco Calabar leading the enemy over the Rio Formoso and the legendary and heroic reaction of the brave Pernambucano and his 20 brave soldiers of Rio Formoso!

The valiant defender died as governor of Maranhão. Its remains are in Belém do Pará, in the Church N. S. of the Carmo.

On March 24, 1633, led by Calabar, 1,200 Dutch attacked the Arraial do Bom Jesus by surprise. Luís Barbalho and other brave captains counterattacked outside the fort with tremendous violence. They repelled the attempt, causing heavy casualties. The Dutch governor himself mortally wounded died soon after.

The war reached a barbaric and inhuman stage. An agreement was reached to curb savagery. temples were forbidden, church fortification, destruction of images, shotguns, poisoned and chewed bullets, offences against prisoners, and the execution of priests, children and women.

And the Dutch expansion accelerated. On December 12, the fort of the Three Magi was capitulated and Paraíba was left in a crossfire. And the Luso-Brazilians were present when the enemy tried to land. This was due to the excellent strategic position of Arraial do Bom Jesus (Velho) where the defensive effort of the Pernambucans was concentrated. This combined with the excellent spy network in Recife. As soon as Matias de Albuquerque discovered the departure of the Dutch fleet to a point on the coast, he sent reinforcements from the Arraial to the threatened point, which came together with the invader's ships.

On the night of March 1, 1634, the celebrated captain, Martim Soares Moreno, made a bold attack on Recife. This is what would be called a commando type operation today. He aimed to burn the village and destroy supplies. With 500 men, he attacked the port at different points. The incursion spread death, confusion and terror among defenders, by reaching the interior of the fortified enclosure. After an epic resistance and furious dispute and a month long siege, on April 8, 1635 the Arraial de Bom Jesus (Velho) capitulated.

He fulfilled his duty, as Headquarters of Resistance to the Invader, for 5 years, when his defenders wrote immortal page with much blood, lives, hunger, renunciations, heroism, and sacrifices. In it, the vigorous soul of the people, catalyzed by the ideal of defending the land and the Catholic faith, had gathered for a long, suffering, immortal and epic protest against the invasion of the Brazilian land.

They surrendered with dignity, exhausted their food and ammunition, and lost hope of receiving any help. There is in the long history of the Dutch war the most significant symbol of the spirit of resistance. Therefore, the ruins in present-day Recife, on the site of the Trinity, should be traveled with respect and reverence patriotic by all who visit the place. The brave people who attacked there made a significant contribution in the distant past to the achievement of the high goals of Sovereignty, Integrity, Integration and Preservation of Brazil's moral and spiritual values.

And under the leadership of Matias de Albuquerque they retired to Alagoas. The course was marked by tombs and crosses of many retreatants who succumbed along the way, of tiredness, weakness, hunger and disease.

It was the "exodus of those who did not despair," in Capistrano de Abreu's expression.

Those brave men lost a battle. Many would return to win the decisive war. Many had the good fortune to return.

In the withdrawal they reconquered Porto Calvo where they arrested the traitor Calabar. He was sentenced to death. The column of suffering and humiliation witnessed the execution and quartering of the traitor Calabar.

The column of Matias de Albuquerque met the troops of Count Bagnuoli in Alagoas. On January 18, 1836 took place the Battle of Mata Redonda commanded by D.Rojas y Borja, there dead in combat and to replace Matias de Albuquerque called to Europe. Without leadership, the Portuguese-Brazilians withdrew. The tactical disaster was not completed, thanks to the brave Rebelinho and Felipe Camarão. These, in the cover of the retreat, practiced prodigies of audacity and courage, creating conditions for the wreckage of the army to be welcomed in Porto Calvo.

In fact, the operations of General D.Rojas marked so tragically in the tactical field were, in the strategic field, of brilliant consequences. He forced the enemy to leave Porto Calvo once more, interrupting the execution of his plan to create a dead zone south of the Manguaba River. Occupying heavily the region of Porto Calvo by ours, was the invader, without its route of terrestrial transport, if not cut, at least seriously threatened, etc.

Bagnuolo took command and concentrated the resistance in Porto Calvo, covering the north direction, in the line of the Una river. The locality attracted to her how many they wanted to fight against the invader, gathering 2,000 men. It then became the most powerful bulwark of resistance, centre of irradiation of fights and last hope of a victory.

Ambush Companies were organized under the leadership of the bravest and most experienced captains. They burst forth unexpectedly in all parts of the occupied territory, destroying sugarcane plantations, taking resources, punishing collaborators, and keeping alive in the invaded populations the hope of freedom.

The enemy has lost the possibility of getting around in the conquest. In every corner and time and place, death rode its steps in the form of arrow, sword, or bullet.

The initiatives of economic uplift of the sugar plantation by the invader were frustrated by the ambushes that set them afire and destroyed as strategy of the weak against the strong.

Luso-Brazilian Army (Part 2)

Armament

As a result of the maritime blockade to which they were subjected and even lack of support from Portugal, due to blockade, their firearms were small and variable, obtained mainly from the Dutch in the previous battles of Monte das Tabocas, Casa Forte and several ambushes.

In addition, they used clubs, staffs, spears used as pikes and, mainly, the sword, on which they based their shock power, and the one responsible for numerous Dutch casualties in both battles of Guararapes, taking advantage of success and in pursuit. After the Dutch first musket volley, the Luso-Brazilians, taking advantage of the difficulty of reloading and closing with the enemy's frontline, carried the sword with all the offensive force. 

In several actions against the Dutch, they had taken possession of considerable artillery. This artillery was used mainly in its fortified strongholds and, presumably, they carried it in campaign in the 1st Battle of Guararapes, numbering 7 ox tractioned guns.

The cavalry was present in a small number in the 1st Battle; it is known that Fernandes Vieira fought on horseback and Captain Antonio Silva commanded the fraction of cavalry.

Training

It was developed to a high degree and during the long period of 18 years of Dutch occupation the technique of ambush attack.

In this type of attack, the surprise, the speed, the initiative, the courage, the judicious use of the terrain and the hand to hand with the sword were fundamental.

It is known that Sergeant Major António Dias Cardoso, when he was secretly sent to Pernambuco to organize the Restoration Army, "Cellula Mater" of the Luso-Brazilian Army, trained for six months the Portuguese-Brazilian civilians. The result of this training was the huge victory they obtained in Monte das Tabocas. With the arrival of the Dutch relief fleet, the Luso-Brazilians organised training areas south of the Jaboatão River (Fort Nazareth, Cape and Muribeca), the rearguard area of ​​the patriots.

Logistics

Because of the maritime blockade, abandonment of agricultural activities to make war, and difficulties of logistical support from Bahia, the patriots experienced serious logistical openings.

For a long time, the daily ration of a patriot soldier consisted of an ear of corn, or a small ration of manioc flour. To compensate for this food crisis, logistics expeditions to Paraíba, Rio Grande do Norte, Bahia, and north and south of Pernambuco were frequently sent to obtain food from the population that supported the Restoration Army.

In this type of operation, the figure of the "Shipowner of the Arraial", Dias Cardoso, frequently stands out, and in long trips under the command of the Field Master General Barreto de Menezes, with the mission to buy, or seize of Dutch supplies, destroying what it could not carry. ("Restauradores de Pernambuco", J.A.G. de Mello).

The patriots stoically endured food deprivation. It was a great humiliation for them, the fact that they were forced to walk barefoot. This situation was compatible only for slaves and Indians, and the use of footwear served as an indicator of the social status of the then man. To nullify the effect of this humiliation, the officialdom democratically, and as an example, throws off shoes and starts walking barefoot. This solved the sociological problem.

From Queiroz Siqueira's report, it is concluded that the population of Pernambuco supplied the soldiers of Pernambuco and Bahia with 5000 daily rations. From the same source is evidenced the "lack of meat for the patriots, who had slaughtered the whole herd, sparing only the oxen destined to draw artillery, as well as lack of clothes and swords, gunpowder and bullets. The artillery guns were 7, and destined for any action, and of the following calibres: 3 of "24", one of "20" and three of "12".

Morale

The moral to fight was very high, because they were patriots defending what they considered their homeland, despite the concerted truce between Portugal and Holland and, in defense of Catholicism, against Calvinism.

The following examples serve to illustrate the moral uprising of these brave, doubly rebellious patriots of Brazil.

From Colonel Waerdenburch (Dutch), in an official document:

"It is difficult to submit by force a people made up of living and impetuous soldiers, to whom nothing short of good direction, and who are in no way like lambs."

This colonel did justice to the soldiers, but he underestimated the chiefs who were going to lead them, magnificently, in the Battles of Guararapes. The reply of the Portuguese-Brazilian patriots to King João IV of Portugal, ordering them to cease their reaction, in fulfillment of the truce treaty signed with Holland and referred to in the beginning was:

"We will not end the reaction until the expulsion of the invader from Pernambuco, and only after, will we go to Your Majesty to pay for the crime of our disobedience."

This double disobedience was a very negative factor in the morale of the patriots, but even so, between two fires, they did not fade.

Fernandes Vieira, Vidal de Negreiros, Henrique Dias and Felipe Camarão used as a means to discredit the promises made by the Dutch, several arguments:

They recalled the recent facts of the Dutch having committed sacrileges against the images of a church in Igaraçu, where they destroyed the images of the saints by the sword.

This profoundly affected the deep-rooted religious sentiment that existed here and achieved with the Holy Inquisition, as can be seen from the "Confessions of Pernambuco, (1594-1595)", 1st Visitation of the Holy Office, by José Antônio Gonsalves de Mello.

And the brave restorers argued:

"Who to the gods makes war, what peace will you keep with the humans?"

Episodes were remembered in Paraíba and Rio Grande do Norte, in which some patriots surrendered, under the word of the Prince of Orange, to save their lives, and then were barbarously slaughtered by allied Indians of the Dutch and by order of these.

The many sexual violence carried out by the Dutch against helpless Luso-Brazilian women, robberies and systematic fires, lives sacrificed in the defense of mills and farms, as well as innumerable temples violated by Calvinist Protestants have not been forgotten.

And they concluded with this argument:

"If the enemy, when he had submitted to us, committed barbarities of every order, what can we expect of him as insurgents?"

After the arrival of the relief squad, the Dutch, disbelieving the power and value of the local patriots, promote a great campaign through pamphlets, in order to undermine the morality of the restorers.

This campaign was carried out shortly before the 1st Battle of Guararapes and motivated the following reactions of the restoration leaders (Lopes Santiago).

From André Vidal de Negreiros:

"We know of no inferiority to whom we shall soon overcome.[...] Come out to the campaign, where we have waited for a long time. [...] Be assured that our maxim is to overcome them or die."

From João Fernandes Vieira:

"Do not deceive yourselves, sirs: Brazil was not made for you."

From Henrique Dias:

"If you have weapons, it is unnecessary to launch pamphlets. My soldiers know little of them, and of the numerous and great muskets they possess, and they handle with great speed and courage, as you always feel. "

From Antônio Felipe Camarão:

"We do not need papers, except for the making of cartridges for our weapons, in which my soldiers believe in more than mere written papers. Come out now for the campaign, which we have discovered in it."

With this patriotic reaction from the restorers to the Flemish pamphlets, the Dutch government of Recife writes disappointed to the Netherlands:

"Even though they endure almost daily setbacks at sea and have a great need for clothing, meat, etc., and to live in a continual uproar, they have rejected the forgiveness that has been offered them."

It was the moral uprising of the restorers, resulting from religion and patriotism, as defined by D. Augusto Álvaro da Silva, Archbishop of Bahia and Primate of Brazil (Revista do Arquivo Público de Pernambuco, 1949).

"Religion and patriotism are two sister concepts, two correlative pulsations of the same heart. [...] Brother Concepts: that brings to mind the mountain of the beatitudes, this one, points the altar of holocausts, one promises and guarantees heaven, the other redeems and sanctifies the Fatherland. [...] Two correlate modes of pulsating the same heart: that is the strongest diastole of the natural irradiation of the human being, this is the most concentrated and decisive systole of freedom and honor of a people, one elevates to the infinite the prize of virtue, the other, conditions to the present the peace and happiness of the future."

Religion and patriotism are brother concepts, different ways of pulsating the same heart. The religious aspect, Roman Catholic apostolic, was a preponderant aggregating aspect of the unity of thought and action of the patriots. This feeling can be concluded from the Confessions of the Holy Office, in Pernambuco, from the end of the sixteenth century, to which we refer. In addition to defending the homeland against the invader, the patriots defended their God and saints threatened by Protestants.

The struggle in Brazil took on an aspect of prolonging the religious wars of Europe, culminating in the Thirty Years War (1618-1648). These strong arguments nullified the effects of the intense psychological warfare waged by the Dutch before leaving Recife to be beaten in the 1st Battle of Guararapes. The report Queiroz Siqueira thus referred to the morality of the patriots to the King, before stating their difficulties:

"What is not lacking to the inhabitants of Brazil is a great courage and courage, to immolate their lives in the service of God, Your Majesty and their Country, to which they are very willing and resolute."

Luso-Brazilian Army (Part 1)

On the Luso-Brazilian side, native improvisation predominated over the ordinances of the newly created Restoration Army of D. João IV, born with the separation of the Iberian crowns, in 1640. The famous Ambush companies were typically Cabocla response to an adversary known superior, difficult to beat in conventional environment.

The unit of employment was the Terço, divided into companies of 200 men, composed of equal number of pikemen and musketmen. For the battle, the infantry formed squares of 50 pikemen, supported in the vertices by other squares of musketmen.

Unlike their opponents, however, the patriots were characterised by not following rigid procedures of combat. The influence of the Indian, who had chief Antonio Felipe Camarão as the most dignified of representatives, had much to do with this type of heterodox behavior. From the work "Do Recôncavo ao Guararapes" by the then Maj. Antonio de Souza Junior, we highlight an interesting quotation attributed to Ardant du Picq: "You can not prescribe such a method of combat, such as organisation, when the combatant's instinct is in contradiction absolute with the ordered methods". 

The Organisation

The Luso-Brazilians were organised in Terços, the basic infantry unit. Each Terço comprised several sections. Each section had a force of around 100 men and was commanded by a captain. A Terço had 300 to 1,200 men and was commanded by a Mestre de Campo (equivalent to Colonel).

Acording to Manuel de Queiroz Siqueira, published in João Fernandes Vieira, vol. II, de J.A.G. of Mello, the forces that fought in the 1st Battle of Guararapes, 19 April 1648, had approximately the following organisation:

Pernambuco Infantry:

24 companies of Fernandes Vieira ........................ 720 men

5 companies from Paraíba ....................................... 160 men

6 companies from Igaraçu and Goiana ........................ 180 men

Indians of Captain Camarão ............................... 350 men

Africans of Governor Henrique Dias ...................... 300 men

3 Mulatos companies ....................................... 80 men

Total ............. 1,790 men

Bahia Infantry:

16 companies ................................................ 700 men

Army Total ............... 2,490 men

The men of Bahia were presumably commanded by Vidal de Negreiros.

The Queiroz Siqueira report predates the 1st Batalha, and the forces mentioned therein, with minor changes, were those that participated in it.

The section, due to the long war of ambushes, developed great capacity of isolated combat.

This organisation followed general Portuguese structure, but with marked Brazilian influence, the result of 18 years of struggle. It was the "Brasílicca" War.

Into the Hinterland

Bandeiras
Beginning in 1619, the Bandeirantes intensified attacks against the Jesuit reductions, and Guarani artisans and farmers were enslaved en masse. However, long before the first settlements began in the Prata basin, the Paulistas were already roaming the hinterland, seeking in the preaching of the indigenous the means for their subsistence.

This "interior vocation" was fueled by a series of geographical, economic, and social conditions. Separated from the coast by the wall of the Serra do Mar, São Paulo returned to the sertão (hinterland), whose penetration was facilitated by the presence of the Tietê river and its tributaries that linked the Paulistas with the distant interior. In addition, although it was distant from the main mercantile centres, its population had grown a lot. It is that a good part of the inhabitants of São Vicente had migrated there when the sugar cane plantations planted in the coast by Martim Afonso de Sousa went into decay, already in the second half of the sixteenth century, ruining many farmers. Connected to a subsistence culture based on slave labor of the Indians, the Paulistas began their expeditions of arrest (or preaching) in 1562, when João Ramalho attacked the tribes of the Paraíba river valley.

The reductions organised by the Jesuits in the interior of the continent were for the Paulistas a gift from the heavens: they gathered thousands of Indians trained in agriculture and manual labor, far more valuable than the ferocious Tapuias of "tongue-tied". In the seventeenth century, Dutch control over African markets, during the period of occupation of the Northeast, interrupted the slave trade. The settlers then turned to indigenous labor. This increase in demand caused a rise in the prices of Indian slaves, considered as "blacks of the land", and cost, on average, five times less than the African slaves. The precariousness of the bandeiras thus became a highly profitable activity. For the Paulistas, attacking the Jesuit reductions was the easiest route to enrichment.

In the face of the attacks, the Jesuits began to retreat inland and demanded arms from the Spanish government. The response was a new offensive, this time triggered by the Asunción authorities in Paraguay which had economic ties with the settlers of Brazil. Even after the end of the Iberian Union, in 1640, when the Guarani finally received arms from the Spaniards, the Paulistas were supported by Bishop Bernardino de Cárdenas, enemy of the Jesuits and governor of Paraguay. The Iberian kingdoms could fight each other in Europe; however, the Guarani community "republics" were the common enemy of all those who were interested in the unlimited exploitation of American lands.

São Paulo
By 1623, when the bandeirismo of arrest was intensified, São Paulo de Piratininga was a small town with a hundred houses of taipa, in whose streets the animals grazed freely. The Paulistas then lived on their farms and farms, meeting in the village only on the occasion of feasts, especially those of a religious character. In this context, it was up to women to watch over daily life, while men made war on the Indians or took care of their business.
In the seventeenth century, this female village had only about two hundred "leather" inhabitants, capable of placing themselves at the head of the flags. However, the vast majority were a multitude of mestizo descendants, born of numerous indigenous concubines. It was this connection with the native, initiated by João Ramalho, that allowed the Paulistas to unravel the paths of the jungle.
A Town Uninhabited by Men
In 1623, so many bandeiras went out that São Paulo became almost a village of women and old men. In that year, Henrique da Cunha Gago and Fernão Dias Leme, uncle of Fernão Dias Pais, as well as Sebastião and Manuel Preto, among others, entered the hinterland once again hunting Indians. The following year, the bandeirantes protested, outraged, against a provision of the governor, who assigned to the Crown a fifth of the captured Indians. The arrest had become a major economic activity. They should, therefore, pay taxes, in the same way as whaling and the brazilwood trade.

At that time, the expeditions of arrest and those of prospecting had different forms of organisation. The first ones, structured militarily by D. Francisco de Souza and later by Manuel Preto and António Raposo Tavares, gathered thousands of Indians, led by a few hundred Mamelucos and Portuguese. Companies were divided up with staffs, vanguards, and flankers. The basic weapons were the bow and arrow, but they also had guns. The prospecting bandeiras were much smaller: some dozens of sertanistas who crept through the woods, trying to pass unnoticed by the warlike tribes. Their armament was light, for defense against possible indigenous and of animals attacks .

Among the points common to both types of expedition were the absence of pack animals and the avoidance of waterways. The regions covered were rocky or covered by woods, more easily crossed by men who were on the march. As for the rivers, it was with them that the majority of the tribes were located: the river route would have nullified any surprise effect essential to the success of the capture. it was only in the eighteenth century, when the Cuiabá mines were discovered, that the monsoons began to follow the Tietê River - or Anhembi, as it was then called - towards the mining centres of Mato Grosso. 
The Mamlelucos
The close contact with the forestry was also reflected in the material culture. The houses, furnished with little furniture, were allied with European and Indian elements: wooden furniture, cots, tables, and coffers to store the small clothing - so scarce that it passed from father to son, consisting of inventories - animal skins scattered on the floor and where the discoverers of mines and diamonds slept. Clay pots, troughs, and rough utensils served the kitchens, and the feeding consisted of beans, meat from hunted animals, or fish, as well as fruit. Among the cereals stood the corn, which soon supplanted the cassava. In addition to these products of native origin, honey was another indigenous legacy, a source of energy widely used in the incursions into the hinterland.
The Price of Prosperity
In the eighteenth century, enriched by the discovery of another, São Paulo won tile roofed houses. The house number then reached four hundred; the first African slaves and the finest porcelain came from the Kingdom or the Indies. The price of this enrichment, however, was the end of the tolerant paternalism with which the Crown treated the Paulistas, loyal subjects, but at times somewhat rebellious. The enslavement of the Indians was formally forbidden, but the Metropolis looked to the gorssa and even pardoned certain slips, even giving honours to the poor people who would "seek their life, their way of profit" amid the dangers of the hinterland.
With the discovery of gold, however, things have changed. From then on, the Crown proceeded to exercise a strict watch on the captaincy. For to pay his commitments to England, Portugal needed every yellow nugget that sparkled in the lands of São Paulo and Minas do Ouro.
The Paulistas in The Northeast
Arriving in Brazil, at the head of a powerful navy, in January 1639, the Count of Torre had the mission of expelling the Dutch from the Northeast. After passing through Bahia, he reached Rio de Janeiro, where he asked Governor Salvador Correia de Sá and Benevides to gather reinforcements in the captaincy of São Vicente. The governor, on the other hand, transferred the task to D. Francisco Rendon de Quebedo, son-in-law of Amador Bueno. After much effort, Quebedo was able to join only 22 infantry and 54 Indians, a somewhat ridiculous amount for those who wanted to expel the Dutch from Brazil. In fact, the Paulistas were more interested in hunting Indians out of the Jesuitical reductions than in fighting the fierce enemies in the distant Northeast. Faced with this, the authorities decided to grant pardon to all "criminals" who presented themselves. Now, bandeirismo was formally considered a crime. But it was also the main activity of the Paulistas. Then the adhesions rained at Quebedo's appeal. João Sutil de Oliveira, "enlisted for the end of his father, Francisco Sutil de Oliveira, to obtain pardon for the many flags in which he took part", and Alberto de Oliveira, "son of Rafael de Oliveira , the Old Man, who made all the expenses of the arming, to be pardoned of the entrances that he made to the hinterland." But the most famous Bandeirante that decided to participate in the expedition was António Raposo Tavares. Reinforced, thus, by the sertanistas, the São Paulo body joined the Count of the Tower in Rio de Janeiro, at the end of 1639. But it was defeated at sea, along with the Portuguese-Spanish fleet, off the coast of Paraíba the following year . The Bandeirantes then disembarked in Rio Grande do Norte, retiring to Bahia, under the orders of Raposo Tavares and Luís Barbalho. Next, Raposo Tavares, after crossing the hinterland, returned to São Paulo to obtain reinforcements, while a group of Bandeirantes continued in the fight against the Dutch. According to some reports, part of the expedition made a much more extensive voyage: when the fleet dispersed on the coast of Paraíba, fleeing before the Dutch, some ships with Bandeirantes continued sailing until arriving at Cartagena de las Indias (Colombia).
Departing From São Paulo
The Paulistas would not have been able to attack the missions for years in a row if they did not have the extensive and veiled support of the colonial authorities. Although it is not known which expeditions were promoted by the Crown and those of private initiative, and the designation of entrances and flags was equally imprecise, the common trait to all of them was the presence, direct or indirect, of the public power. Often it was this that financed the expedition; others only closed their eyes to the enslavement of the Indians (illegal since 1595), accepting the pretext of "just war".
The "Defensive" Wars
Public interest and private interest were interconnected from the "defensive" expeditions of the sixteenth century, directed against the tribes of the Paraíba valley, Anhembi (Tietê), Mogi-Guaçu and other rivers of São Paulo headed by the captains-mores and authorities, these attacks preserved the settlement nucleus on the plateau - and revealed the economic potentials of "Indian hunting" (preaching). During the government of Jerónimo Leitão, who was chief captain of São Paulo from 1579 to 1592, the officers of the Chamber decided, "in the name of the people," that the war be carried to the Carijos, Tupino and Tupiniquins. The front of forces composed of Mamelucos, Jerónimo Leitão ravaged the villages of Anhembi for six years, enslaving many Indians.
In Search of Gold
The offensive bandeirismo, of arrest, coincided with the arrival in São Paulo, in 1599, of D. Francisco de Sousa, seventh governor-general of Brazil (1591-1602). Certain of the existence of precious metals in the interior, D. Francisco organised several entrances, that left of diverse points of the Colony. In addition, it assigned official structures to the expeditions, which received military divisions, field ombudsmen, clerks and chaplains, in addition to pre-determined scripts.
Sponsored by D. Francisco were the flags of André de Leon (1601) and Nicolau Barreto (1602). The former sought silver mines and crossed the hinterland for nine months, following the valleys of the Tietê and Paraíba rivers, passing Mantiqueira and reaching the springs of the São Francisco river. The second extended for two years. He would have arrived in the region of Guairá, returning with a considerable number of Indians, which some sources estimate in 3000.
From then on coexisted the exploration expeditions (search of precious metals) and of capture ("hunting to the Indian"), and defined the general lines of the bandeirante expansion. Taking their flags to the south, the Paulistas reached the reductions of the Tape and of the river Uruguay to the southwest, those of the Guairá; and to the west, those of Itatim. But there were also expeditions that toured the lands of Minas Gerais; others, crossing the Goiás and Matogrosso hinterland, ascended the tributaries of the Amazon and reached the great river, while others were confronted in the São Francisco basin with the northeastern cattle breeders' march inland. Brazilian territory defined its contours, gained internal cohesion - and the bandeirantes, already famous for knowing the dangers of the sertão were called by the authorities to fight distant enemies: the Dutch, the "brave Indians" of the sugar northeastern and the blacks who rebelled against the regime of slavery.
Into the Hinterland
Even before Martim Afonso's arrival in São Vicente in 1532, Indian hunting was practice in the region. The Portuguese who had settled there dedicated themselves to the rescue of slaves and prisoners of war of the tribes with which they had friendly contacts. Two centres of traffic were distinguished: Tumiam, in the old village that preceded the town of São Vicente, and the one of Cananéia, with Antônio Rodrigues ahead and the famous Bachelor, being that it belonged to João Ramalho and his mamelucos established in the plateau supply the first of those warehouses.

The Vincentians knew how to take advantage of the Tupiniquins' fights with Carijós and Tupinambás to increase the traffic with the prisoners made in these wars, which "descended to S. Vicente, then known as the mouth of the Sertão and the port of the slaves." They pushed the settlers to the regions of San Francisco do Sul and Laguna, depopulating them from Indians. Still others sought the Paraguayans by bartering them with the Spaniards for iron and other merchandise. As São Paulo de Piratininga was replacing Santo André as an advanced point of colonisation of the sertão, the indigenous resistance to the occupation of its lands became active. The reaction of Carijós and Tamoios caused that expeditions against them were organised, from São Paulo. These were the so-called "defensive struggles" or "just wars", which eventually "cleared" the indigenous lands while justifying their enslavement. Numerous rush against them were made in this period through the valleys of Paraíba, Tietê, Moji Guaçu and Alto do Paranapanema. Jerónimo Leitão, captain-general of the Captaincy of São Vicente (1571-1592), stood out in the fight against the Tamoios in Rio de Janeiro and against the Tupiniquins and Carijós in the Tietê valley. In 1581, heading southwest, crossed the Paranapanema and reached the region of Guayrá, where he would make new incursions in the following years, from there bringing the first waves of Indians.

This sixteenth-century bandeirismo - mistakenly called a defensive one, for if one had something to defend were the natives, of whom the Portuguese threatened not only the lands and the freedom, as the life itself - was directed by captains-mores, governors or prepositions officers of these leaders and represented a preparatory phase of what would occur in the seventeenth century, since it enabled the Vincentians to capture the man of the land and the penetration of the hinterland.

In the early seventeenth century, Holland, claiming itself in the Atlantic domain, disrupted the slave trade into the New World colonies. Given the difficulties posed by the Dutch threat to trade and the African labor squares, the flow of the "commodity" to a series of colony points diminished, which, resenting the shortage of slaves for work, became interested again in the indigenous. It was the Paulistas who were able to take advantage of the new market that was opening up. It compensated them now to make the capture of the Indian a great company, attractive for the investment of the inhabitants of the captaincy, who collaborated in various ways, hoping to profit from the rescue of Indians in great quantity to be sold in the squares of Rio, Espírito Santo and Bahia.
Organisation of the Bandeiras
São Paulo was a small town. The bush grew everywhere. But it was to this village that the tired Bandeirantes like Raposo Tavares returned from the adventures..

In the first decade of the seventeenth century, shortly after Nicolau Barreto's return with innumerable "pieces" (the so-called slaves, Indians or blacks) were captured, the Paulistas threw themselves into the hinterland.
The bandeiras of Diogo de Quadros (1606), Manuel Preto (1606-1607), and Belchior Dias Rodrigues (1607-1609) were thus succeeded. The former warred the Carijós, Manuel Preto returned from the region of Guairá with Indians, used in his farm of Our Lady of the Hope. The other two bandeiras followed to the region of the "bilreiros" Indians, unidentified tribe, probably located between the rivers Paraná, Paraguay and Araguaia. The truth is that the expedition of Martim Rodrigues was totally destroyed.
In 1610 the entries of Clemente Álvares, Cristóvão de Aguiar and Brás Golçalves left, all directed to the backwoods of the Carijós. The next year was Diogo Fernandes and Pêro Vaz de Barros - the latter at the head of a bandeira organised by D. Luís de Souza, son of D. Francisco de Souza, destined to imprison Indians in the Guairá missions to work in the Mines of Araçoiaba. In 1612, Sebastião Preto went to Guairá, returning with many Indians. Three years later, Lázaro da Costa took a south course, while Antônio Pedroso Alvarenga carried his flag to the sertões of Goias, reaching Tocantins and its tributaries.
The organisation of the Bandeiras coincided with the government of D. Francisco de Sousa, arrived in Brazil in 1599, the intensification of the activity of the flags, centred in São Paulo. It dates from the beginning of the great flags, organised and disciplined with military divisions, field ombudsmen, clerks, chaplains and established itineraries. The term flag was initially applied to Portuguese militia companies, which by their regiment should consist of 250 men. This rule was not valid here, however, since it was named after an expedition of fifteen or twenty men to others with hundreds of members. Most, on any flag, consisted of indigenous auxiliaries, slaves or free, used as road pickers, food pickers, guides, porters, and so on, while the white and mestizo Paulistas formed the nucleus. "Over time, the Paulistas became as skilled in the arts of the sertão and the bushland as the Amerindians were, or even, according to some contemporaries," like the beasts themselves. "These flags frequently travelled the interior for months and years. even though they used to plant cassava in forest clearings and camped in the vicinity until the time of harvest, but mostly they depended on hunting, fish they got from rivers, fruit, herbs, roots and wild honey. They used bow and arrow as much as muskets and other firearms, and, except for the weapons they carried, they set out on their journey with remarkably light luggage.

Most of the present-day representations of the seventeenth-century Paulistas, whether in painting or in sculpture, show them as a kind of Pilgrim Father in his dress, and in high riding boots. But, in fact, they seem to have done very little except for the broad-brimmed cape, beard, shirt, and coats. They walked almost always barefoot, in Indian file, along the outback trails and the bush paths, although they often carried a variety of weapons. His garments also included thickly padded cotton gibbons which proved so useful against the Amerindian arrows that in 1683 it was suggested that they be used in the war against the warlike natives of Angola on the other side of the Atlantic. The feminine element was still present in the larger bandeiras, for although the Paulistas did not take legal wives on their expeditions, they were often accompanied by Amerindian women, such as cooks and concubines.

The first bandeiras, however, had in view the search for precious metals and stones, as those of André Leão (1601), who sought silver mines, reaching as far as the sources of the São Francisco; and the bandeira of Nicolau Barreto (1602), which took two years in the Sertão, provoking divergences as to the point reached, whether it was the valley of the San Francisco or the Silver or Peru.

After the departure of Francisco de Sousa to Portugal, the Paulistas continued in their penetrations, although in search of the immediate profit through the capture of natives. Thus were the bandeiras of Diogo de Quadros and that of Manuel Preto in 1606 and that of Belchior Dias Carneiro in 1607. It was, however, the great mass of Indians "domesticated" present in the Spanish Jesuit reductions, who greatly encouraged the the first half of the seventeenth century.

The Dutch Wars, 1624-1654 (Part 1)

If the Union of the Iberian Crowns (Portugal and Spain) 1580-1640 attracted traditional enemies of Spain to Brazil, it also made possible its expansion beyond the meridian of the Tordesillas by bandeirantes from São Paulo and by captain Pedro Teixeira in the Amazon. Expansion to the kingdom of Portugal, in the name of the king of the two Iberian crowns.

This expansion took place almost at the same time as the history of the struggles to expel the French from Maranhão, the English, Irish and Dutch of the Lower Amazonas and of the Dutch from the Northeast, where they acted between 1624-54.

Causes of The Dutch wars

Periods of the war:

1st - Invasion and recovery of Bahia, 1624-1625;

2nd - Invasion and conquest of Pernambuco, 1630-1636;

3rd - Government of Prince Maurice of Nassau, 1637-1644;

4th - Insurrection and the Pernambucan Restoration, 1645-1654.

The commercial and religious dispute (Spanish Catholicism X Dutch Calvinism) ended up involving Brazil after Union of the Iberian Crowns. To invade Brazil, a Portuguese colony under the Spanish crown, the Netherlands organised the West Indies Company and provided them ships, troops and money. This company was forced to invade the Northeast of Brazil twice. The first in Bahia, in 1624, the second in Pernambuco, in 1630. The invasions gave rise to the Dutch Wars (1624-1654) or War of the Thirty Years of Brazil, extension of the Thirty Years War in Europe (1618-1648). The greatest wealth of the Northeast of Brazil was sugarcane that found an ideal environment in the massapê1 lands, near the coast. This product was ensuring excellent profits for Portugal and Spain.The North east was unprepared militarily to face a potent and planned invasion. Only the ports of Recife and Salvador possessed the satisfactory conditions to repel piracy, but not those of squadrons.

Invasion of Bahia - 1st Period

On May 8, 1624, a powerful Dutch fleet commanded by Admiral Jacob Willekens  consisting of 26 ships armed with 500 guns and garrisoned by 3,300 men, of those 1,700 soldiers for land operations and occupation, appeared in front to Salvador. It was an impressive fraction of one of the most famous armies of the time. 

On the 9th, the Dutch attacked and the Portuguese fortresses responded. The invader sought to avoid being hit by using a detailed plan of the fortifications. Using 16 vessels, the Dutch fixed the defenses of Salvador and attracted the reserves.

While the fortresses were duelling with the enemy fleet, five ships, which the Dutch had left outside the estuary, approached the St. António Fort and landed on the beach a force of approximately 1,500 men.

Without stopping the avalanche of well-planned invasion and against which it was futile to resist, the military garrison and the population left Salvador overnight inland. The next day, by land and sea, the Dutch launched attacks on the abandoned city.

Realising the exodus, the invader entered Salvador, plundering everything and imprisoning the Governor General who had not left his post. The headquarters of the General Government of Brazil fell into foreign hands.

Near a league of the walls of Salvador, the Bahians raised the Arraial of the Red River. Henceforth this camp became an obstacle to the expansion of the invasion to the west, in combination with the system of ambushes, or guerrillas, against the invader.

Through judicious use of the terrain and the use of tactics of native Brazilian wars, the Bahians organised the ambush companies composed of 25 to 40 men, to take the fight without quarter to the invader.

There arose in Brazil a new type of war, the Brazilian war, which would cause so much surprise and admiration among the Europeans, with a genuine local military doctrine.

In a short time, the ambushes completely surrounded Salvador, bringing death and destruction to every enemy who left the walls trying to find supplies to maintain the conquest.

The Dutch governor Van Dorth and his successor, Colonel Albert Shouten, commander of the ground force, fell under the ambush. The success of the ambushes and the dread of which the invader was taken increased the confidence, the audacity and the determination of the defenders, in order to expel him.

The testimony of Father António Vieira, then living in Bahia, gave an account of the heroism and sacrifices of the Bahians to liberate the invaded land.

'... They spent nights and days without sleeping and resting, they lived and slept without a roof, they precariously fed on flour, they suffered at times cold, hungry and thirsty, and lacking in ammunition that was achieved with their own enemy, through ambushes ... '

The only abundant thing among the Luso-Brazilians was the spirit for the struggle and the great desire to free Bahia.

Valuable offensive instruments and particularly noted in the reaction during this acute period of ammunition shortage were the Indian archers of Bahia villages.

Dutch dense formations were often seen tumbling under their breasts, by surprise, clouds of arrows that have caused them many deaths and injuries. The more daring enemies, in preparing the arquebus to revoke the attack, fell to the ground, with the chest struck by arrows.

They found, lastly, that the West Indies Company had erred in its strategic appraisal. He had not noticed the soul of the people, worried that it was easy profits and high dividends, all resulting in the happy expression of Luis Delgado - "a confrontation of a soul x a business", in which the soul would come out victorious. It was to give time to time! It was necessary to complete the siege of Salvador with the maritime blockade.

In short, improvised squadrons, of canoes and armed boats, sailed the bay and realised the isolation of the invader by sea.

It was difficult for the Dutch to land in other parts of the Recôncavo to seek survival resources. The siege of Salvador has become more and more rigorous. Inside the wall about 2,800 enemies were trapped. 1,600 Dutch soldiers, 700 mercenaries of various nationalities and 500 armed slaves were besieged by more than 1,400 Luso-Brazilians.

On March 29, 1624, he founded, near Ponta do Padrão, a powerful Portuguese-Spanish fleet under the command of Fradique de Toledo. It consisted of 52 warships and about 12,000 men, including soldiers and sailors, of whom approximately 4,000 were Portuguese. There were close to 1,200 cannons..

Even more significant was the reinforcement of the Bahian resistance by a contingent of whites and Indians brought from Rio de Janeiro, by sea, Salvador Correia de Sá e Benevides, and from Pernambuco by Jerónimo de Albuquerque Maranhão. The tradition of solidarity and mutual support of the different parts of nascent Brazil continued, in favor of the territorial and cultural integrity of the country.

Salvador was submitted to a strict siege, which gradually tightened until the invader, yielding ground, abandoned the forts and sought protection on the city walls.

As of April 6, 1625, the struggle became more and more intense and, according to Fr. Vincent of the Savior, an eyewitness, "for twenty-three days there was not a quarter of an hour, day and night, without to hear the roar of bombards, grenades, and muskets from side to side. "

The invader capitulated, in the face of evidence of the futility of reaction, on the 30th of the same month of April.

Delivered Salvador with all his values, in addition to the armament and ammunition, ships, slaves and released the prisoners. On the other hand, they allowed him to return to the Netherlands with clothes, supplies for three months, weapons and ammunition for the defense on the journey. The officers kept their swords.

On May 1, 1625, Fradique de Toledo, in front of the brave Luso-Brazilians from Bahia, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and the powerful troops brought from Spain, triumphantly entered Salvador before Dutch domination completed one year.

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1. Massapé is a very dark, almost black soil type found in the coastal region of northeastern Brazil. The massapé is a very fertile soil and therefore excellent for the practice of agriculture. In the colonial period, it was greatly exploited in sugarcane farming. The massapé has in its composition a high presence of clay. It forms through the decomposition of granite, in tropical regions that have well defined dry and humid seasons. In the humid season, the massapé has a sticky consistency and in the dry season it becomes rigid.